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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LEE BROWN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE 
MORGAN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 14468 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a jury verdict and judgment of 
the Court in favor of the Defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This action was tried to a jury on October 23 and 24, 
1975. At the conclusion of the evidence, the Court instructed the 
jury and submitted the case to them on Special Interrogatories. 
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In answer to the first Interrogatory, the jury found that Appellant's 
contract of employment with Respondent to be not divisible. In 
answer to the second, third and fourth Interrogatories, the jury 
found that Plaintiff had resigned his position as a coach, but not 
his position as a teacher. In answer to the fifth Interrogatory 
the jury found Plaintiff's damage to be $10,371.39. Thereafter, 
Plaintiff moved the Court for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
on the grounds that the issue of the divisibility of Plaintiff's 
contract of employment with Respondent was not divisible as a 
matter of law. The Court entered judgment in favor of Respondent 
and against Appellant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant seeks to have the Court reverse the 
judgment and order of the lower Court finding that Appellant's 
contract of employment with Respondent was divisible as a matter 
of law, that Respondent breached its contract of employment with 
Appellant, that it did not comply with the requirements of the 
Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act, Utah Code 
Annotated, Sections 53-51-1 et seq. (Supp. 1975), and that 
therefore, Appellant is entitled to reinstatement as a school 
teacher and damages in the sum of $10,371.39. 
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FACTS 
Appellant was employed by Respondent as a school teacher 
for the school years 1972-73 and 1973-74 pursuant to written contracts 
Additionally, Appellant was assigned to coach football and wrestling 
for which he received additional compensation. Appellant's Exhibit 
1 was executed June 18, 1973 for the school year 1973-74 and is 
his most recent contract of employment with Respondent. 
Appellant considers two sentences of the contract relevant 
to this case. One sentence provides: MYour salary according to the 
basic schedule will be $7,814." The other sentence provides: 
"Amounts for extra services will be added when definite assignments 
have been made." It is Appellant's contention, as will be more 
fully developed below, that Appellant's contract of employment 
was severable. 
The Respondent is a duly organized and existing School 
District and political subdivision of the State of Utah. 
On January 8, 1974, while still employed by Respondent, 
Appellant addressed a letter to Mr. Jerry Peterson, the Principal 
at Morgan High School where Appellant taught and to Mr. Raymond P. 
Larson, Superintendent of the Respondent School District, in which 
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he stated he was resigning from the "coaching staff at Morgan High 
School11 and further stated that "I am not resigning as a teacher.11 
The full text of that letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 2. 
On or about January 17, 1974, Superintendent Larson 
wrote to Appellant stating he had presented Appellant's letter to 
the Board of Education of the Morgan County School District at a 
meeting held January 14, 1974, and that the Board had decided to 
accept his resignation as a coach. The letter then stated: MThe 
Board wishes me to instruct you that your services as a teacher 
will also be terminated at the close of the 1973-74 school year.n 
A copy of that letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 3. 
» On February 1, 1974, a conference was held between 
Superintendent Larson, Miss Dorothy Zimmerman and Appellant at 
which Appellant stated that he had not resigned his employment 
with the Respondent School District but that he had resigned only 
his position as a coach. T. 29. 
4 
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On March 22, 1974, Superintendent Larson received a 
second letter from Mr. A. M. Ferro, Appellant's attorney, requesting 
a termination hearing. A copy of that letter is attached hereto 
as Exhibit 4. 
On April 5, 1974, Mr. Felshaw King, counsel for the 
Respondent School District, replied to Mr. Ferrors letter indicating 
that the Respondent School District was under the impression that 
Appellant had resigned his teaching position and therefore a 
hearing would not be in order. A copy of that letter is attached 
hereto as Exhibit 5* 
Respondent has a Written Agreement, which is by reference 
incorporated into every teacher's contract of employment and was 
so incorporated into Appellant's contract of employment. 
The Written Agreement was admitted in evidence as 
Appellant's Exhibit 5. Sections 14-1-1 and 14-1-2 of the Written 
Agreement are material to this case for the reason that Respondent 
did not comply with those provisions. T. 148 
5 
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Section 14-1-1 provides: 
Before any teacher may be dismissed for any cause, 
he shall be given a written notice 15 days prior 
to the effective date of dismissal signed by the 
Superintendent or his representative, stating the 
causes for dismissal. Such written notice may be 
delivered in person or sent by registered mail 
addressed to the teacher at his last known post 
office address. A copy of the "Personnel Procedures 
for Certificated Employees11 shall be included with 
the notice. 
Section 14-1-2 provides: 
After receipt of such notice the teacher shall at 
his option be entitled to hearings before (1) the 
Superintendent of Schools, (2) the appropriate 
committee of the Board of Education, and (3) the 
Board of Education. The teacher may call the 
Association, school staff, and such other witnesses 
as he may deem necessary. Said hearing shall 
commence within 30 days after receipt of such 
notice. 
It is agreed by the parties that Respondent did not 
follow the requirements of its own Written Agreement. Appellant 
contends that Respondent's failure to follow the Written Agreement 
is a breach of the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act, 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 53-51-1 et seq. (Supp. 1975). 
6 
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On October 22 and 23, 1974, the facts surrounding 
Appellant's employment with Respondent were heard by a jury. 
Pursuant to Special Interrogatories submitted to them, the jury 
responded to Interrogatory number one finding that Appellant's 
contract of employment with Respondent was not divisible. In 
response to Special Interrogatories numbers two, three and four, 
the jury found that Appellant's letter dated January 8, 1974, 
constituted a resignation only of his duties as a coach, and not 
as a teacher. In response to Special Interrogatory number five, 
the jury found that the Appellant had been damaged in the sum of 
$10,371.39. Following the jury verdict, Appellant made a motion 
for Judgment Notwithstanding the Jury Verdict on the grounds that 
Plaintiff's contract of employment was divisible as a matter of law. 
On January 15, 1975, the Court entered a Judgment in 
favor of the Respondent and against the Appellant on the grounds 
that the jury had found Plaintiff's contract of employment to be 
not divisible and on the further grounds that the contract, as a 
matter of law, was not divisible. Accordingly, the Court reasoned 
that the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act, supra, 
did not apply in this case. 
7 
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ARGUMENT 
t ' ' ' . - ' , ' POINT I .:-, V".', ••. V 4 . - : • » »-.. • 
vi THE COURT ERRORED IN SUBMITTING THE QUESTION OF 
THE DIVISIBILITY OF APPELLANT'S CONTRACT OF 
EMPLOYMENT TO THE JURY. r 
Appellant submits that the question of whether or not 
a contract is divisible is a matter of law to be decided by the 
C o u r t .
 ;. t y-< '-•: .. U:J ; •'• " :•".. ; <•"'• > 
«.,.-:
 f The question of interpretation of language r;m.lK: n » 
and conduct -- the question of what is the 
meaning that should be given by a court to r 
the words of a contract, is a question of 
fact, not a question of law . . . . There n 
is no fllegal!f meaning separate and distinct 
from some person's meaning of fact. Corbin ? \ 
on Contracts, Section 554 at page 219 (1960). 
We must bear in mind, however, that the 
j - question of fact is like any other question 
of fact in that it may be a question that 
.. should be answered by the judge rather than 
by the jury. Id_. at pages 220-221. 
In.cases in which it is so answered, it is 
7 probable that the interpreting judge may say y 
that the interpretation of language is a 
ri "question of law for the court.fl Icl. at U ?' 
page 221. 
If the words of an agreement, whether oral or 
written, are definite and undisputed, if there 
is no doubt as to the relevant surrounding 
circumstances, the interpretation of the words 
is ordinarily held to be amatter for the court. 
Id. at pages 224-225. 
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The Court has held the interpretation of 
contract to be primarily a question of law 
for the Court to decide. Pacific States 
Cast Iron Pipe Co. v. Harsh Utah Corporation, 
5 Ut.2d 244, 300 P.2d 610 (1956). 
The rule expressed by this Court has support from other 
jurisdictions. 17A CJS, Contracts, §616, p. 1242. 
The rule that the construction or legal affect 
of a contract must be determined by the court 
as a question of law applies when the contract 
is clear, unambiguous and where there is no 
dispute as to the terms of the contract. 17A 
CJS, Contracts, §616, pp. 1241-1242. 
Appellant submits that the language used in his contract 
of employment with Respondent was clear, unambiguous and should 
have been decided by the court as a matter of law. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT'S CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT IS DIVISIBLE 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Appellant submits that his contract of employment with 
Respondent was divisible as a matter of law for the reason that 
one paragraph specifically states that Appellant was hired as a 
teacher and that his salary for the 1973-74 school year was 
$7,814. A separate paragraph provides that: lfAmounts for extra 
services will be added when definite assignments have been made.11 
9 
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Unfortunately, no formula has been devised which 
furnishes a test for determining in all cases which contracts are 
divisible and which are entire. 17 Am. Jur.2d, Contracts, §325. 
Hudson v. Wylie, 242 F.2d 435 (C.A. Cal.1957); Higgins v. Green 
Top Dairy Farms, 273 P.2d 399 (Idaho 1954). 
Professor Williston states: 
The distinguishing mark of a divisible contract 
is that it admits of apportionment of the 
consideration on either side so as to correspond 
to the unascertained consideration on the other 
side. Where such a purpose appears in the 
contract or is clearly deducible therefrom, it 
is allowed great significance in ascertaining 
the intention of the parties . . . . when there 
are no opposing signs. Where these latter 
are present it becomes a question of preponderance. 
5 Williston on Contracts, S860 p.255 (3rd ed. 1963). 
In Simmons v. California Institute of Technology, 
34 C.2d 263, 209 P.2d 581 (1949), it was suggested that the test 
to determine the divisibility of a contract is, if the consideration 
is single, the contract is entire, but if the consideration is 
expressly or by necessary implication apportioned, the contract is 
severable. Accord 17 Am. Jur.2d, Contracts, |326. 
10 
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In Pines of Islip v. Island Concrete Corp,, 196 NYS2d 
252 (1959) at page 255 the court concluded that where performance 
of one of the provisions of a contract was optional with the 
defendant, the contract was severable. 
In Higgins v, Green Top Dairy Farms, supra, the court 
found a contract to purchase a dairy farm to be divisible on the 
ground that one of the contested provisions of the contract 
involved unliquidated claims. 
It was not contemplated or provided by the 
contract that plaintiffs could arbitrarily 
fix an amount claimed to be due for merchandise 
and other items, and demand that payment be 
made within forty-eight hours. JA. at p. 405. 
Following Appellant's return to school at the beginning 
of the 1973-74 school year, he was assigned to coach wrestling and 
football for which he was paid $434.85 and $260.91 respectively. 
If the contract is severable where the part 
to be performed by one party consists of 
several distinct and separate items and the 
price to be paid by the other is apportioned 
to each item or is left to be implied by the 
law. 17 Am. Jur.2d, Contracts, §327.. 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appellant submits that his contract of employment with 
Respondent was severable in that the only written provisions 
i 
covered his employment as a teacher. The additional coaching and 
football assignments were made separately and were not included 
in the written contract. Each specific assignment was paid a . 
separate sum. Furthermore, the written provisions of the contract 
made clear that Respondent had the sole authority to decide whether 
or not Appellant, who had already signed a written contract of ( 
employment with it, would be given additional assignments and 
additional compensation. Clearly, Respondent had no obligation to 
make any additional assignments or pay any additional compensation 
to Appellant pursuant to the terms of the contract. 
Appellant could not have compelled Respondent to pay 
him any additional compensation for extra duties, nor could he 
have compelled Respondent to assign him coaching duties. 
Appellant submits his duties as a coach were severable 
from his teaching duties for the reasons: 
1. His salary as a teacher is clearly set out while 
his compensation for his coaching duties were not. 
12 
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2. The compensation paid him for coaching is clearly-
identifiable and is separate from his coaching salary. 
3. The written contract admits of apportionment of 
the consideration on either side so as to correspond to the 
unascertained (at the time of the contract's execution) 
consideration on the other. (Williston). 
4. Whether or not performance of any additional 
assignments would be made to Appellant was optional with 
Respondent. 
5. The amount to be paid Appellant was, at the time 
the contract was executed, discretionary (and possibly 
arbitrary) with Respondent. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF DEMANDED 
FOR THE REASON THAT RESPONDENT BREACHED ITS 
CONTRACT WITH APPELLANT. 
As Appellant did not resign his position as a teacher, 
but only his extra assignments as football and wrestling coach, 
he is entitled to damages for breach of contract in the sum of 
$10,371.39 and for an order reinstating him as a teacher. 
13 
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Respondent's Written Agreement was by reference incorporated into 
and made part of Appellant's contract of employment with Respondent. 
Sections 14-1-1 and 14-1-2 are fully set forth above. Those 
Sections state the procedures Respondent must follow in order to 
terminate a teacher employed by it. Appellant was and is entitled 
to have the contractual rights of Sections 14-1-1 and 14-1-2 of 
the Written Agreement enforced by this Court. Respondent concedes 
that it did not comply with the requirements of Sections 14-1-1 
and 14-1-2 of its Written Agreement. Respondent's Answers to 
Appellant's Interrogatories R. 97, 99, 101 and 103 through 105. 
See also Exhibit 5. . 
POINT IV 
THE UTAH ORDERLY SCHOOL TERMINATION PROCEDURES 
ACT GOVERNS IN THIS CASE. 
A. AS APPELLANT DID NOT RESIGN HIS POSITION AS 
A TEACHER, HE IS ENTITLED TO THE PROTECTION OF 
THE UTAH ORDERLY SCHOOL TERMINATION PROCEDURES ACT. . 
Appellant submits that the argument set forth above 
with respect to Respondent's Written Agreement raise issues 
relevant to the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act, 
14 
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Sections 53-51-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated (Supp. 1975), 
hereinafter "Termination Act." Specifically, Sections 14-1-1 and 
14-1-2 of the Written Agreement which set forth a procedure for 
giving notice and authorizing a hearing on the request of the 
teacher, bring Appellant within the protection of the Termination 
Act. 
The relevant subsections of Section 53-51-5 of the 
Termination Act provide that a school district shall adopt an 
orderly dismissal procedure which must provide: 
(1) Right to a fair hearing. 
(2) If the district intends not to renew (the) 
contract of employment of an individual entitled to 
employment in succeeding years according to district 
personnel program, notice of such intention shall be 
given the individual. Said notice shall be issued at 
least two months before the end of the contract term 
of the individual, e.g., the school year. The notice 
in writing shall be served by personal delivery or by 
certified mail addressed to the individual's last known 
address. The notice shall be dated and contain a clear 
and concise statement that the individual's contract 
will not be renewed for an ensuing term and the reasons 
for the termination. 
(3) In the absence of timely notice, a subparagraph 
(2) employee is deemed to be re-employed for the succeeding 
contract term with a salary based upon the salary schedule 
applicable to the class of employee into which the 
individual falls. This provision shall not be construed 
to preclude the dismissal of an employee during his 
contract term for cause. 
15 
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(4) At least one month prior to issuing notice of 
intent not to renew the contract of the individual, he 
shall be informed of the fact that continued employment 
is in question and the reasons therefor and given an 
opportunity to correct the defects which precipitated 
possible nonrenewal. The individual may be granted 
assistance in his efforts to make correction of the 
deficiencies which may include informal conferences 
I and the services of applicable school personnel within 
the district. 
(5) A written statement of causes (a) pursuant to 
which the contract of individuals may not be renewed, 
(b) pursuant to which the contract of each class of 
personnel may not be renewed, and (c) pursuant to which 
the contract of individuals may be otherwise terminated 
during the contract term. 
Section 53-51-6 of the Termination Act provides: 
At all hearings, after due notice and on demand 
of the educator, he may be represented by counsel, 
produce witnesses, hear the testimony against him 
and cross-examine witnesses and examine documentary 
evidence. Hearings may be held before the board 
or the board may establish a procedure whereby 
hearing is before examiners selected pursuant to 
section 53-51-7. 
Respondent concedes that it did not comply with the 
requirements of the above cited requirements of the Termination 
Act. Respondent's Answers to Appellant's Interrogatories R. 
97, 99, 101 and 103 through 105. See also Exhibit 5. 
16 
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Appellant submits that the purpose of the Termination 
Act is remedial. As such, it should be liberally construed of 
effect the conduct sought to be corrected. 73 Am. Jur.2d, Statutes, 
g278. 
As Respondent did not comply with the provisions of the 
Termination Act, Appellant is entitled to his loss of salary and 
to reinstatement by Respondent. 
Subsections (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Section 53-51-5 of 
the Termination Act contemplate that teachers whose performance is 
unsatisfactory should be given notice of such finding for the purpose 
of enabling the teacher to take steps to correct the teacher's 
deficiency. 
In the present case, the deficiency would be Appellant's 
resignation of his duties as a coach. Pursuant to the Termination 
Act, the Respondent, upon receiving Appellant's letter resigning 
his position as a coach but not as a teacher, should have complied 
with the requirements of the Termination Act including a written 
notice advising Appellant that if he persisted in refusing to 
render services as a coach, he would also be terminated as a teacher. 
17 
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B. EVEN IF APPELLANT'S CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT 
IS NOT DIVISIBLE, HE IS ENTITLED TO PROTECTION 
UNDER THE UTAH ORDERLY SCHOOL TERMINATION 
PROCEDURES ACT. 
Appellant submits that the Termination Act applies in 
this case whether or not his contract of employment is divisible. 
The clear intent of Appellant's letter resigning his 
duties as a coach but not as a teacher, was to resign only his 
coaching duties. The jury so found in its Answers to the Special 
Interrogatories submitted to it. 
Even if Appellant's contract is not divisible, it is 
clear that his letter of resignation of January 8, 1974 was for 
the purpose of resigning only his coaching duties. The intent of 
the Utah Orderly School Termination Procedures Act is to require 
school districts to warn teachers that a course of conduct, if not 
corrected, will result in their termination. 
Subsection 53-51-5(2), set forth ahve, provides that the 
district must in writing notify any teacher whose job security 
is protected by the Act, of the districtfs intention not to renew 
the contract of employment. 
18 
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Subsection 53-51-5(4) provides: 
At least one month prior to issuing notice of 
intent not to renew the contract of the individual 
he shall be informed of the fact that continued 
employment is in question and the reasons therefore 
and given an opportunity to correct the defects 
which precipitated possible nonrenewal. 
It is conceded by Respondent that it did not comply 
with subsection 53-51-5(4). It did not notify Appellant that 
his resignation of his coaching duties placed his continued 
employment in question nor did it give Appellant an opportunity 
to correct the defect which precipitated the nonrenewal of his 
employment. 
Accordingly, Appellant is entitled to be awarded damages 
for loss of salary in the sum of $10,371.39 and for an order 
reinstating him as a teacher. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. The terms and provisions of Appellant's contract of 
employment with Respondent are clear and unambiguous. Accordingly, 
the question of divisibility of the contract is for the Court to 
decide as a matter of law. 
19 
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i 
2. As a matter of law, Appellant's contract of employ-
ment with Respondent is divisible for the reason that: 
< 
a. His salary as a teacher is clearly set out while 
his compensation for his coaching duties were not. 
b. The compensation paid him for coaching is clearly < 
identifiable and is separate from his coaching salary. 
c. The written contract admits of apportionment of 
i 
the consideration on either side so as to correspond to the 
unascertained (at the time of the contract's execution) 
consideration on the other. 
d. Whether or not performance of any additional 
assignments would be made to Appellant was optional with 
Respondent. 
e. The amount to be paid Appellant was, at the time 
the contract was executed, discretionary (and possibly 
arbitrary) with Respondent. 
3- As Appellant did not resign his position as a 
teacher, he is entitled to be compensated for his damages arising 
from Respondent's breach of its contract with Appellant and for 
an order of the Court reinstating Appellant. 
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4. Respondent's Written Agreement created in Appellant 
certain job security rights which could only be terminated by 
Respondent following the requirements of the Utah Orderly School 
Termination Procedures Act. As Respondent did not comply with 
the requirements of the Act with respect to Appellant's termination 
as a school teacher, Appellant is entitled to his lost salary in 
the sum of $10,371.39 and to an order reinstating him as a teacher. 
5. Appellant was entitled to notice that his resignation 
as a coach but not as a teacher would be grounds for terminating 
his services as a coach pursuant to subsection 51-53-5(4). Having 
failed to comply with that requirement of the Act, Appellant is 
entitled to damages and reinstatement. 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant is entitled to a 
judgment against the Respondent in the sum of $10,371.39 and for 
an order of the Court reinstating him as a teacher with the 
Respondent at a salary together with such benefits as he would have 
received had he remained employed with Respondent. 
/j 
Respectfullysubmitted, 
MICHAEL T / MCCOY 
414 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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APPELLAM'S EXHIBIT 1 
Lee R. Brown 
Morgan, Utah 
Dear Lee: 
We are pleased that negotiations have been completed by the committee 
representing the teachers and the Morgan School Dictrict. These negotiations 
were carried on with a good feeling and desire to reach a solution that would 
be equitable for everyone. Since they are now completed and since all of the 
teachers are included in the master contract, we feel the following information 
will be sufficient to complete agreements between each teacher and the school 
district. 
Contract period will be 185 days. 
Your salary according to the basic schedule will be $ 7,814 
Amounts for extra services will be added when definite assignments 
have been made. 
School calendar will be 160 days as shown on enclosure. 
We would appreciate it if you would sign one copy and return to the 
District Office. 
If you have any questions please contact us. 
',--). 
. v^/V?y?i.i,: ,> w ^ii-iftn- -t- -
I / C t i n f l r 4 n f - n n / l a n * ' ' fl C ^ r n i o f n r / i 9 uperintendent'e Signature) (Teicher's Signature) 
{•/r-73 
(Date) 
sn 
£ Av 1 
/ V ./ / ,"\ i 
(Date) 
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• APPELLANTS E U.BIT 2 
NV;::I'J: Z : M O T A . ' . . . 
DATS './.:..<>..*..JS 
RErc:..ra UNDA VAN TAS;L:.L 
January 8, 1974 
Mr. Jerry Peterson, Principal 
Mr. Raymond Larson, Superintendent 
Morgan County School Board of Education 
Morgan, Utah 84050 
Gentlemen: 
This letter is a formal resignation on my part from the coaching staff at 
Morgan High School. 
1 am not resigning as a teacher and I will continue to try and uphold the 
high academic standards which you have set. 
I no longer feel that my presence in the athletic program would be bene-
ficial to anyone involved in the program. My personal and professional 
opinions and priorities are drastically different from the opinions and 
priorities which the District's athletic program is now being run on. 
There is also the problem of financial security, which is my personal 
problem. Coaching in this school district has been a problem of financial 
loss instead of gain—especially during this last year. 
I cite the following examples: 
1. Trips to Ogden to straighten out equipment orders or pick 
up last minute supplies. 
2. Using my car to take kids home to Croyden, Milton or the 
Highlands because the practice ran longer than the one 
hour and fifteen minutes we are presently on, or because 
it is a Saturday practice or Holiday practice. 
3. I lost an opportunity to pick up 7*i hours of college creditf: 
worth about $200 because I was coaching. I need 6 credit 
hours to get to the B.S. plus 30 lane on the salary schedule 
which will raise my salary $300. It will cost me an addi-
tional $200 travel to go to the University of Utah to receive 
this credit. 
These expenses may seem insignificant but when you compare them with my 
coaching salary: $175 net for football + $350 net for wrestling - $525 
net for coaching. 
I feel it cost me $275 out of my pocket, which only gets $7814 this year 
GROSS income from teaching, 
I feel that to be a good coach, you have to sacrifice everything of your-
oclf and your athletes. However, I no longer feci like I have anything 
to sacrifice* 
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Mr. Jerry Peterson, Principal & Oth cs 
Page 2 
January 8, 1974 
i 
Please consider this resignation effective at the conclusion of the Morgan 
High School Wrestling Season. 
Sincerely, 
Lee R/ Drown 
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BOARD OF EDUCATION 
RAYMOND P. LARSON M O R G A N C O U N T i S C H O O L DISTRICT PHONE 820-3411 
• UFEOINTCNDCNT OFFICE OF TH E SU PER INTENDENT 2 4 ° E A S T Y ° U N G S T R E E T 
M O R G A N , U T A H 
0 4 0 5 0 
January 17, 1974 
Lee Brown 
RFD 
Morgan, Utah 84050 
Dear Lee: 
I presented your letter concerning your position as a coach and 
teacher in the Morgan School District to the Board of Education at 
their regular meeting, held January 14, 1974. 
They would like me to express their appreciation to you for the 
services you have rendered during the years you have been employed 
in the Morgan District. They regret the differences you have expressed, 
as to your feelings and the District program as it is being operated. 
They hereby accept your resignation as a member of the coaching staff 
of Morgan High School for the reasons which you have stated. 
However, since you were hired as a coach and teacher, and since 
it will be necessary to employ someone to replace you as a coach, it 
will also necessitate this person being employed to replace you as a 
teacher; therefore, the Board wishes me to instruct you that your 
services as a teacher would also be terminated at the close of the 
1973-74 school year. 
This action and understanding will permit the administration to 
begin interviewing someone to replace you both as coach and teacher. 
Sincerely, 
(' O /*V". . 
L^^^^^^^y^^^ 
Raymond P. Larson, 
Superintendent 
RPL:pp 
cc: Jerry Peterson 
EXHIBIT 
Board Members **( 
feuSrU;. i,^W*L 
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2nd District Court, Utah 
GmU$£2\miU4^2J-7^' 
-Board of Education 
Morgan County School District 
240 East Young Street 
Morgan, Utah 84050 
ATTN; MR. RAYMOND P. LARSON, SUPERINTENDENT 
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR HEARING - LEE BROWN - NONRENEWAL 
OF CONTRACT 
Gentlemen: 
. • i 
rs :ie 
Morgan County. School District 
March 22, 1974 
Page 2 
This letter is written to you by me as attorney for Lee Brown. 
In his behalf, 1 hereby make request for a hearing upon the 
matter of the intention of the Board not to renew the contract: 
of employment of Lee Brown* 
.,.. .. - - —•* 
It is hereby requested that the hearing be conducted before one 
or raore examiners as contemplated by Sections 53-51-6 and 53-51-7 
of the Code. 
It is further requested that the Board provide Mr. Lee Brown with: 
a. A statement of the causes pursuant to which it is 
intended not to renew his contract of employment, and 
b. Notification as to the time and place at which the 
hearing will be held. 
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A. M. Ferro, Esquire 
Attorney at Law 
Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Our Client: Morgan County School District 
Your Client: Lee Brown 
Dear Mr. Ferro: 
We are replying to your letter of March 22, 1974, 
addressed to the attention of Mr. Raymond P. Larson, 
Superintendent of Schools of Morgan County School 
District, as follows: 
It is the position of the Morgan County School 
District that Mr. Brown resigned his position as a 
teacher by letter of January 8, 19 74, a copy of which 
we presume you have in your possession. Accordingly, 
the provisions of the Utah Orderly School Termination 
Procedures Act are not pertinent and there is no 
necessity for a hearing in connection with this matter. 
If you have any questions concerning this matter, 
please contact us at your convenience. 
Thank you very much. 
Very truly yours, 
KING & KING 
Felshaw King 
FK:smg 
^L^I^--^-
ft>d Ui^rict Oo i i , i..:t:J 
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